Remembering the Battle for Australia by Rechniewski, Elizabeth
 
PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010. 
Fields of Remembrance, special issue, guest edited by Matthew Graves and Elizabeth Rechniewski. 
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal 
PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remembering the Battle for Australia 
 
Elizabeth Rechniewski, University of Sydney 
 
 
Introduction 
On 26 June 2008 the Australian minister for Veterans’ Affairs, Alan Griffin, announced 
that ‘Battle for Australia Day’ would be commemorated on the first Wednesday in 
September; this proclamation fulfilled a Labor Party election promise and followed a 
ten-year campaign by returned soldiers and others to commemorate the battles that 
constituted the Pacific War. The very recent inauguration of this day enables an 
examination of the dynamics of the processes involved in the construction of national 
commemorations. The aim of this article is to identify the various agencies involved in 
the process of ‘remembering the Battle for Australia’ and the channels they have used to 
spread their message; to trace the political and historical controversies surrounding the 
notion of a ‘Battle for Australia’ and the conflicting narratives to which they have given 
rise; and to outline the ‘chronopolitics,’ the shifts in domestic and international politics 
that ‘over time created the conditions for changes in the memoryscape and, sometimes, 
alterations in the heroic narrative as well’ (Gluck 2007: 61). 
 
The title of this article is intended to recall Jay Winter’s insistence that the terms 
‘remembering’ and ‘remembrance’ be used, rather than memory, in order to emphasise 
the active role of agents in the creation and perpetuation of memory and acts of 
commemoration (2006: 3). Timothy Ashplant, Grant Dawson and Michael Roper, in a 
broad ranging study of war memory, emphasise the role of constituencies, or agents of 
remembrance in the process of memory formation and the struggle to articulate distinct 
and often competing memories in the array of arenas available. Agencies of articulation 
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include the official bodies of the nation state, political parties, the organisations and 
movements of civil society and more localised face-to-face groupings (Ashplant et al. 
2004: 16–17). In the complex and evolving relationship between these agencies we can 
begin to find an explanation for the sanctioning of certain memorial days, and the 
‘forgetting’ or overlooking of others. Ashplant et al. identify two other aspects of the 
articulation of memory: narratives and arenas. Narratives of articulation ‘refer to the 
shared formulations within which social actors couch their memories’ (16), the 
templates or ‘schema’ through which experience is understood, and memory framed. 
Such narratives often call on templates offered by dominant national, but also religious 
and political, discourses, on existing ‘cultural narratives, myths and tropes’ (34). Arenas 
of articulation refer to ‘the socio-political spaces within which social actors advance 
claims for the recognition of specific war memories,’ for commemoration and 
memorialisation, and for the benefits that may flow from recognition. They range from 
networks of families or kinship groups, through communities of geography or interest 
(returned soldiers of a particular unit or battle), to the public sphere of nation states and 
transnational power blocs (17).  
 
It seems necessary to add to these three categories that of ‘modes of articulation’: the 
channels through which memories are revived and constructed, that may include film 
and documentaries, novels, biographies and autobiographies, and the publications of 
professional and amateur historians. Modes of articulation influence the framing of 
memories and their emotional impact, the ease of dissemination, and the symbolic 
weight or significance attached to them. The role of the media, and of new technologies 
such as the internet, is particularly significant today in creating virtual communities of 
interest, in facilitating campaigns, and indeed in creating virtual lieux de mémoire 
online, through the design of sites that include archival material, images, maps, and 
testimony. 
 
A crucial passage in the perpetuation of memory occurs when it moves from popular, 
informal arenas of remembrance, maintained at the level of family and communities of 
interest—referred to by John Bodnar (1992) as the ‘vernacular’—to the level of official 
representation by State and Federal governments, recognition that brings into play 
crucial financial and organisational support. It is misleading, however, to assume that 
the ‘vernacular’ represents an accurate and authentic version of events because based on 
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direct, personal experience. This case study draws attention to some of the limitations of 
individual and collective memory and therefore of oral history. It also illustrates the 
problematic and sometimes conflictual relationship between history and memory and 
poses the question of whether, as Pierre Nora asserts, memory has come today to 
challenge, and even dictate to, history (1989). 
 
 
 
Battle for Australia cenotaph, 2008 © Matthew Graves 
 
 
The history of the term ‘Battle for Australia’ 
The expression ‘Battle of Australia’ was used on only a few occasions during the 
Second World War, most notably by Prime Minister John Curtin when he told the 
country on 16 February 1942 that the fall of Singapore ‘opens the Battle of Australia’ 
(Day 2005: 272), echoing Churchill’s speech that the fall of France (Dunkirk) opened 
the ‘Battle of Britain.’ The expression was taken up with a slight modification as the 
‘Battle for Australia’ in a 1944 Department of Information photographic booklet 
(Stanley 2008a: 165) but was then almost forgotten as a concept for fifty years, until the 
term was ‘resurrected in the 1990s by groups of veterans and those concerned that the 
sacrifices of the war years were being forgotten, overshadowed by the traditional focus 
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on Gallipoli’ (Stanley 2008a: 246). Adopted by James Bowen in a letter to the National 
President of the Returned and Services League of Australia (RSL) in 1997, it became 
the focus of the Battle for Australia Commemoration National Council, formed in 1998. 
 
The problem, however, in using the expression ‘Battle for Australia’ is in knowing 
exactly what it covers. Does it refer simply to the period 1942–1943, the years when the 
Australian government mobilised the country under the apparent imminent threat of 
Japanese invasion? This is the period that most of the official commemorative speeches 
in September 2008 chose to highlight, and that James Bowen’s ‘The Battle for Australia, 
1942–1943’ website also selects (Bowen 2001). Or should the ‘Battle for Australia’ 
designate the years 1942–1945, from the fall of Singapore to the Japanese surrender, as 
the Battle for Australia Commemoration National Council proposes on its website 
(n.d.)? Martin Evans argues that remembered wars are those that tend to possess 
‘temporal coherence’; in other words, clear chronological boundaries mark their 
beginning and end (1997). A second and related difficulty lies in locating the ‘Battle for 
Australia’ geographically: even if the period is limited to 1942–43, a wide range of 
battles could be included, ranging across land, sea and air.1 Unlike the cliffs of Gallipoli, 
whose distinctive geography carries a clear visual resonance, the ‘Battle for Australia’ is 
not represented topographically in the national imagination.  
 
A third difficulty refers to the choice of a specific commemoration date. Various 
possible candidates appeared on the national calendar, including the dates of the Coral 
Sea battle, 4–8 May. Coral Sea battle commemorations, which involved the Australian 
and US governments at the highest level, had been held since the first week of May 
1946. In the mid-1950s these events were described, in a briefing paper written for the 
US representative, General Doolittle, as the second most important national 
commemoration after Anzac Day (Doolittle 1956). Another option was 15 August, 
Victory in the Pacific (VP) day, which marked the surrender of the Japanese and had 
been commemorated since the end of the war. 19 February marked the date of the 
bombing of Darwin, and, indeed, the organisation of veterans involved in the defence of 
the city, ‘the Darwin Defenders,’ argued that this date should be selected to 
commemorate Battle for Australia Day (Jones 2008). Finally, a date might have been 
                                                
1 James Bowen, for example, explains that he initially proposed that the ‘Battle for Australia’ be limited 
to the Battle of the Coral Sea and ‘three vital battles’—the Kokoda Track, Milne Bay, and the Beachheads 
Buna, Gona, and Sanananda—but expanded the term’s scope after discussion with David Horner (Bowen 
2001). 
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chosen to mark the battle along the Kokoda track, since this protracted struggle 
resonates strongly in the contemporary national imagination, but it was not. 
 
The decision was instead made, partly it seems under the influence of Bowen’s 
arguments, to commemorate Battle for Australia Day on the first Wednesday in 
September, the date of the Battle of Milne Bay, the first land victory over the Japanese.2 
Although this date and battle had little public recognition, the day is now the principal 
state-sanctioned date commemorating World War II: Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, in his 
speech on the day of the first commemoration in September 2008, noted that the nation 
had finally, after half a century, settled the question of the date on which to 
commemorate the war. He made clear, however, that the date and the phrase ‘Battle for 
Australia’ were intended to represent all the engagements of this period, thus including 
them in a narrative of unified military and national purpose, with Rudd careful to refer 
also to the role of civilians on the home front (Rudd 2008). 
 
It was Serge Moscovici who pointed out the power of ‘objectification’: conjuring up a 
coherent and unitary entity through the creative power of naming (1984: 43). Ashplant 
et al. recognise this power in naming wars and the same may be said to hold true of 
battles: ‘the willingness or refusal of the state to recognise and name particular kinds of 
violence as “a war” in the first place together with its bestowal of names upon particular 
wars, are fundamental to the construction (and contestation) of the national narrative 
and official memory’ (Ashplant et al., 2004: 53). The significance of, and the reasons 
behind, the attribution of a single nomenclature—‘Battle for Australia’—to a wide 
range of military engagements are explored in the rest of the article.  
 
Agencies and arenas of articulation 
James Bowen (2001) traces on his website his own role in initiating the campaign for 
the recognition and commemoration of the ‘Battle for Australia.’ A historian with a 
particular interest in the Pacific War, an Honorary Counsel and a State Executive 
member of the Victorian branch of the RSL, he wrote in 1997 to the RSL national 
president, Major General ‘Digger’ James, to press for a commemorative week in 
September ‘whose specific purpose would be to enable children to appreciate and 
                                                
2 Between 25 August and 7 September 1942, a major Japanese assault sought to secure Milne Bay in New 
Guinea as a base for sea and air attacks on Port Moresby. The Allied defenders, including 4500 Australian 
infantrymen and RAAF Kittyhawk fighters, had by 6 September driven the Japanese forces back to their 
main base. 
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acknowledge the heroism and sacrifice of the Australians who held off the Japanese 
invaders in the Australian Territory of Papua, and forced their retreat in September 
1942’ (Bowen 2001). The proposal was refined and adopted by the National Executive 
of the RSL in late November 1997, and confirmed at its 1998 conference, when the 
Battle for Australia Commemoration National Council was formed.3 The RSL is 
accorded a privileged role by State and Federal governments and agencies, the media, 
and the wider society, in representing the point of view and interests of ex-servicemen 
as their authentic voice. The RSL is thus endowed, in Bourdieu’s terms, with symbolic 
capital (1993). It also has the resources and a countrywide network of organisations to 
disseminate information and mount campaigns. A private initiative was thus taken up by 
a powerful agency and given a national platform and a semi-official status, since the 
committee included representatives from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. At the 
1998 RSL conference, then Prime Minister John Howard expressed his support for their 
campaign—but did not promise to inaugurate a national day of commemoration.  
 
The Council takes a broad view of what this battle comprised, seeking to ‘honour and 
learn from the heroism, sacrifice and service of all those who fought between 1941 and 
1945 to defend Australia, its territories and national interests from attack and ultimately 
to expel the Japanese from Australian territory and waters.’ Although the expression 
‘national interests’ could be read to include other theatres of war, the focus in this and 
other of the Council’s statements is on the Japanese threat.4 They identify as the key 
battle that of Milne Bay, in which Australian army, navy and air forces played the major 
role, united for the first time under one commander, the Australian major general Cyril 
Clowes, a Duntroon graduate. The website quotes Field-marshal Sir William Slim: 
‘Australian troops had, at Milne Bay, inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted 
defeat on land ... some of us may forget that, of all the allies, it was the Australians who 
first broke the invincibility of the Japanese army.’ These details, which draw attention 
to the crucial role that Australians played, and the casualties they suffered (Australian 
casualties were many times greater than those among US forces), help to explain the 
choice of this battle as the focus for commemorative activities. They also, perhaps, 
                                                
3 After disagreement with the Council, in May 2001 James Bowen set up his own website, ‘The Battle for 
Australia Historical Society,’ which has a URL very similar to that of the National Council. 
4 In December 2008 the author interviewed for this article the then NSW representative on the Battle for 
Australia Commemorative Council, David Cooper. He has prepared a map that portrays graphically the 
battles and forces engaged in the South West Pacific War between 1942–45 and the line of the Japanese 
advance. 
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suggest one reason for the marked decline in recent years in commemoration of battles 
such as the Coral Sea, in which Australian forces played a lesser role. 
 
To explain why the Council was set up at this point in time, I suggest we look to the 
challenge of intergenerational transmission and the significance of the passage from 
‘communicative memory’ (living oral memory based on personal recollection) to 
‘cultural memory’ (cultural representations that lack the immediacy of firsthand 
recollection). The passing of the WWII generation and, therefore, the imminent end of 
communicative memory of this period, has seen a final battle waged over the content of 
the future cultural memory, of which this is an example. The emphasis in the literature 
produced by the Battle for Australia Commemoration Committees on educating children 
about the ‘momentous events of our national history between 1942 and 1945’ is striking. 
Reference is also made to the age of the veterans of the Pacific campaigns and the need 
to preserve the memory of their sacrifice and commitment.5 However two further 
factors have a bearing on the campaign for recognition of this day: the ‘political wars’ 
and the ‘history wars.’ 
 
Carol Gluck argues that the activities of voluntary groups or agents of remembrance 
alone have little chance of success unless the political context is propitious (2002: 61). 
Certainly the arrival in power of the Rudd Labor government in November 2007 was a 
crucial factor in the success of the campaign. In gazetting the first Wednesday in 
September as Battle for Australia Day, the Labor government was continuing an 
orientation towards commemoration of the Pacific rather than the European theatre of 
WWII that had begun, at least, with the former government of Paul Keating. In 1992 
Keating kissed the ground of the Kokoda track, Papua New Guinea, that had been 
defended in 1942 by a largely militia force as the Japanese sought to consolidate their 
positions along the arc of islands to Australia’s north. Keating declared the ground 
sacred to Australia: ‘There can be no deeper spiritual basis to the meaning of Australian 
nation than the blood spilled at this place’ (quoted by Edwards 2001). In ‘shift[ing] the 
epicentre of Australian nationalism from Gallipoli to Kokoda,’ Keating was, writes 
James Curran, asserting the ‘defence of Australian self-interest over the call of British 
sentiment’ (2002: 484). The conservative side of Australian politics—the 
Liberal/National Coalition—, on the other hand, has invested heavily in the 
                                                
5 In pamphlets supplied by David Cooper and on the National Council website. 
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commemoration of Gallipoli as the most significant national day and is accordingly 
suspicious of the motives behind the push to commemorate the Pacific War. These 
party-political differences are further expressed in conflicting interpretations of the 
conduct of Churchill and Curtin during the war, as the ‘political wars’ of 2005 made 
clear. 
 
Conflicting narratives of the events of 1942: ‘The political wars’ 
In May 2005, then Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer gave a speech, 
‘Freedom, the Spread of Democracy and Contemporary Challenges in Foreign Policy’ 
(the Earle Page College’s Annual Politics Dinner lecture at the University of New 
England), and wrote several articles in The Australian offering a strong critique of what 
he called the Labor Party’s weak and inept role in pursuing war in the 1940s, and 
referring to the party as foreign policy appeasers whose weak-minded attitudes continue 
to this day (Teichmann 2005: 67–68). His strongest attack was turned against the Labor 
war-time Prime Minister John Curtin, accused of failing to acknowledge the threat 
posed by Nazism and of panicking when he demanded the return in 1942 of the 
Australian troops that Churchill wanted to send to Burma. One of the aims behind 
Downer’s attack was no doubt to undermine Labor’s credentials in criticising the war in 
Iraq and Afghanistan at a time when these wars were going badly, but his arguments 
reflect a broader ideological difference between the two parties. 
 
Downer’s arguments were widely criticised, even in Quadrant, known for its 
conservative orientation, where Max Teichmann wrote a nuanced account of the 
policies of both Labor and the Liberal and Country Parties in the 1930s and early stages 
of the war (Teichmann 2005; see also McMullin 2005 for a more robust response). 
Kevin Rudd, then Foreign Affairs spokesman for the Opposition, wrote a rebuttal also 
published in The Australian, in which he defended Curtin and, turning the tables, 
accused Menzies of hesitation in defending Australia’s national interests (Rudd 2005). 
Rudd’s defence of Curtin and of his demand to Churchill that the Australian troops be 
brought home to defend the country, demonstrates the continuity in the Labor Party’s 
perspective on WWII; it is the logical extension of Keating’s pilgrimage to the Kokoda 
Track in 1992.  
 
This political confrontation is explained in part by adherence to two strands of 
nationalism. An older form, linked to the commemoration of Gallipoli, has come to 
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represent the original ties with Britain; this is paradoxical, one might think, since one 
strand of the Gallipoli legend suggests that ANZAC troops were betrayed by the 
incompetence and stupidity of British generals. To draw attention to the events of 1942, 
on the other hand, associated as they generally are with the fall of Singapore, the failure 
of British protection and Churchill’s intransigence, is related to a partial rejection of 
Britain and its heritage, and the assertion of the right to make new alliances in the 
national interest, even though, again paradoxically, the new alliance both during and 
since WWII has been with that rather overwhelming ally, the USA. These ideological 
differences, which do not usually translate into clear strategic distinctions, should not be 
exaggerated: John Howard, for example, made much during his period as Prime 
Minister of Australia of being the USA’s closest ally. Moreover, Kevin Rudd as Prime 
Minister has distanced himself from Keating’s radical nationalism, and specifically 
from his dismissal of the significance of Gallipoli (Shanahan 2008). However, gazetting 
the ‘Battle for Australia Day’ enabled the Labor party to mark (and perhaps even 
exaggerate) a political difference from the conservative side of politics through a largely 
symbolic gesture. 
 
Conflicting narratives of 1942: The ‘history wars’  
The ‘history wars’ that have been waged around this issue are a lesser-known example 
of the controversies that have inflamed academic and public debate over recent years in 
Australia. The most notorious of the recent ‘history wars’ in Australia, no doubt, are 
those concerning the early relations between the white settlers and the Aborigines, 
‘wars’ over issues ranging from the extent of early massacres to the intentions behind 
the removal of the ‘stolen generations.’ But another set of history wars over the 
existence of a ‘Battle for Australia’ has been rumbling along since the late 1990s and 
has become intertwined with the broader political controversy over the interpretation of 
history and its relevance to contemporary policy. 
 
The political and the history wars both gained heightened intensity in 2005 and 2006 
with Alexander Downer’s lecture (2005), Peter Stanley’s article in the Griffith Review 
(2005), and the Memorial Oration given in 2006 by Stanley, then Principal Historian at 
the Australian War Memorial (Stanley 2006). Stanley’s fundamental argument, 
developed at greater length in his book Invading Australia (2008), is that since there 
was no Japanese plan to invade Australia, the use of the term ‘Battle for Australia’ to 
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refer to a disparate range of battles is misleading and historically unjustifiable. His 
condemnation of the campaign to recognise a Battle for Australia is severe: ‘people who 
accept the Battle for Australia thesis, especially in its more extreme manifestation, have 
abandoned any claim to be judging the past according to the classic tenets applied by 
Western historians over several centuries.’ He accuses them of allowing feeling to 
overwhelm reason—‘the only basis for these beliefs is an emotional one’ (2008a: 
248)—and of parochialism, showing interest only in those battles that most closely 
affected Australia and its region, thus overlooking or downplaying the broader, world-
wide conflict and the values that Australians fought for in all the theatres of war and on 
behalf of many oppressed peoples. The push to recognise a Battle for Australia Day 
links disparate battles ‘into a single dramatic saga of threat and salvation,’ a powerful 
narrative, in Ashplant’s terms, and one that, as Stanley argues, ‘stitches together a raft 
of unconnected events to give the impression that the Japanese wanted Australia and 
would have got it except for this battle’ (Stanley 2008b: 7). 
 
The ‘Battle for Australia’ claim is a revisionist one, Stanley argues, that overturns sixty 
years of historical research, during which the consensus had been that, although there 
was discussion of the possibility of invasion put forward by some middle-ranking naval 
officers, these proposals were strongly opposed as a practical impossibility by the army, 
and Japan never drew up plans to invade Australia. This represents a different situation, 
therefore, from the threat posed to Britain by Germany, which had drawn up concrete 
plans to invade. Although for some months in early 1942, the Australian intelligence 
community and the government considered invasion a real possibility and took 
measures accordingly, including mobilising the population to greater effort, by mid-
1942, and particularly after the sea battles of the Coral Sea (May) and Midway (June), 
there was sufficient clear evidence and advice for the government and Curtin to know 
that the threat of invasion was remote. If Curtin did not acknowledge this publicly until 
mid-1943, this was no doubt in order to keep the population mobilised in the war effort, 
and perhaps because of Curtin’s own caution. 
 
Stanley has been supported by some military historians, including Jeffrey Grey (2008) 
and John Connor (2008), and more provocatively by Stephen Barton, former Liberal 
staffer and now a political scientist at Edith Cowan University. In an article in The 
Australian, published not coincidentally on the eve of Anzac Day 2006, Barton argued 
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against the new commemorative focus on the Pacific War: ‘The elevation of Kokoda to 
the great defining Australian battle is a reflection not of the importance of that battle, or 
indeed the unique suffering and fighting ability of the troops, but because it can be 
absorbed into a mythical quest for Australian independence’ (Barton 2006). He 
concluded:  
 
Keating once observed that the Labor Party writes Australian history, it creates the heroes and 
villains. In this, at least, he is quite correct; the ALP and its coterie of sympathetic historians, such 
as Manning Clark, David Day, Ross McMullin and Stuart Macintyre, are the standard bearers for 
the dominant view of Australian history. They embrace the battle of Kokoda because it can be 
twisted to fit their preferred narrative: Australian troops abandoned by the perfidious English, 
fighting alone, with plucky Labor man Curtin battling Churchill, as well as the Japanese (Barton 
2006). 
 
The counter attack 
Stanley’s position has been under sustained attack since 2002, when he gave the ‘He’s 
(Not) Coming South’ conference paper, an attack that was renewed after the Griffith 
Review article in 2005 and the Memorial Oration in 2006, and climaxed with the 
publication of Invading Australia. The charge has been led by James Bowen on his 
Battle for Australia website (2001). Relying heavily on a small number of historians, 
notably Henry Frei (1991) and David Horner (1993), Bowen mounts a direct and 
virulent attack on Stanley—referring to him on more than one occasion as ‘British-born 
Stanley’6—or his ‘one-sided myth argument and his constant diminishing of Curtin’s 
wartime role.’ Stanley’s position as Principal Historian at the Australian War Memorial 
rendered his views all the more galling to his critics, and pressure was placed by Bowen 
and others on Major Steve Gower, Director of the Memorial, to dismiss him. Stanley 
resigned from the War Memorial in December 2006 and has since moved to a position 
with the National Museum of Australia. 
 
Stanley’s views were subsequently opposed at greater length in Bob Wurth’s 1942: 
Australia’s Greatest Peril (2008a). Although Stanley is referred to only in a footnote 
(Ch 1, fn 3: 373), the whole weight of Wurth’s argument, using extensive research into 
Japanese archives, seems designed to contradict Stanley’s thesis and emphasise that 
‘influential elements of this great navy [the Japanese] wanted to invade Australia in 
1942’ (2008a: 3). While Wurth concludes this statement with the concession that ‘they 
never got as far as issuing orders to invade,’ he and other critics maintain that Stanley 
underplays the threat of invasion and pays insufficient attention to the evidence in 
                                                
6 The implication, of course, is that Stanley lacks an Australian national perspective.  
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Japanese navy archives, biographies and officers’ autobiographies that ‘the Imperial 
navy’s threat to Australia was both real and imminent’ (2008b: 7). He emphasises the 
‘hopelessness of the Australian situation by March 1942’ (2008a: 173) and the military 
justifications for the belief by Curtin and the High Command in the imminence of 
invasion. 
 
Four major books were published in 2008 and 2009 devoted to Australia’s role in the 
Pacific War and addressing directly or indirectly the question of whether Japan intended 
to invade (Stanley 2008a; Wurth 2008a; Thompson 2008; Grose 2009). The debate was 
carried on in late 2008 in articles and book reviews in many newspapers and journals, 
including The Australian and the tabloid Sun-Herald, sometimes involving the 
confrontation of the opposing positions. It was pursued online on the website framed 
around Wurth’s book and was also the topic of radio programs and talkback radio: Peter 
Stanley participated in an ABC Radio National ‘Australia Talks’ program in August 
2008 with Peter Thompson, author of Pacific Fury: How Australia and Her Allies 
Defeated the Japanese Scourge. Thompson seeks, as he writes in the Introduction, 
through the evidence gleaned from interviews with survivors, war records and diaries, to 
convey the deep fears and suffering of the Australian population of the period. Like 
Wurth, he does not refer directly to Stanley by name in his book, but his approach offers 
the vivid, emotional counterweight of lived experience to Stanley’s dispassionate 
review of the actual risk of invasion.7 The investment of the media in this issue can be 
explained by the clearcut, even virulent differences of opinion, always good copy, that 
involved questions not merely of academic interpretation but of the lived experience of 
a considerable section of the population. The talkback program elicited many responses 
from listeners who had lived through the war and referred to the ‘proofs’ of the 
imminence of invasion, which I discuss below.  
 
The limitations of communicative memory and oral history 
The uneasy relationship between history and memory in the contemporary world is well 
illustrated in this debate. As Stanley emphasises, one of the primary sources for the 
widespread belief in the narrowly avoided invasion by the Japanese are the memories of 
those who lived through the war: ‘A deep lode of family memories informs the popular 
                                                
7 It is not the aim of this article to assess these divergent positions; nor is the author qualified to do so. 
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understanding of 1942’ (2008a: 233).8 Civilians were subjected at the time to visually 
colourful and terrifying propaganda posters depicting, for example, a giant, gun-
wielding Japanese soldier marching south, with accompanying highly charged text; a 
government poster from 1942, for example, stated: ‘He’s coming south. It’s fight, work 
or perish.’ Participants in the talkback forum recalled seeing ‘invasion money’ printed 
by the Japanese in preparation for the occupation of Australia, seized overseas by 
Australian troops; and hearing rumours of actual landings that were hushed up by the 
government, of the existence of the ‘Chinese map’ showing the route of Japan’s planned 
invasion, or of the ‘Brisbane line,’ the line above which Australia would be handed over 
to the invaders. Stanley however has shown with a wealth of documentation and 
research that this ‘evidence’ is entirely unsubstantiated, and on these points he has 
generally not been challenged.9 Another powerful source of memory is to be found in 
the memoirs of Australian prisoners of war who were told by their captors of the 
planned invasion—and even sometimes of its success (Stanley 2008a: 236–37)—for 
reasons that can be imagined readily. 
 
These erroneous ‘memories’ illustrate the limitations of the vernacular, and of cultural 
memory and oral history. Oral history may reveal—as little else can—the lived, 
subjective experience of the participants, but its usefulness and its accuracy as a source 
of historical knowledge are questionable, not only because of the limited perspectives 
and knowledge of the participants but because of the extent to which memory is 
reformulated by the ‘scripts which later generations form and disseminate about 
significant events in the past’ (Winter 2006: 278). Moreover, personal memory can be 
influenced both ‘downstream’ of the events it records, as ‘scripts’ re-write and over-
write original experience, and ‘upstream’ by existing narratives that provide the 
‘templates,’ scripts, frames or schema through which experience is understood. 
Ashplant et al. suggest that individual subjects represent their experiences, even the eye-
witness memory of war, ‘through the pre-existing narratives fashioned by the agencies 
of the nation-state and civil society’ (Ashplant et al. 2004: 33), but also, I might add, 
under the influence of the stories and images offered by popular film and literature, such 
as the fictional representations of invasion from the North that had been common in the 
                                                
8 Stanley quotes an opinion poll from the Daily Telegraph in 2005, showing that more than three-quarters 
of respondents shared this belief (2008a: 239).  
9 The military historian Jeffrey Grey concludes his review of Invading Australia: ‘Stanley’s almost 
forensic analysis of the claims advanced in support of invasion has effectively demolished their 
evidentiary basis’ (2008: 46). 
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pre-war period (Walker 1999; Stanley 2008a). It is not nowadays well remembered—
and this is a striking lacuna in memories of World War II—that a strongly hierarchical 
view of race was the dominant ideology before and during the war years, and that the 
‘claim of effective proprietorship over the continent’ for the British race was not felt to 
be secure (Day 2005: 237). My own research into the relations between Australia and 
New Caledonia has revealed the extent of the concern in Australia throughout the 1930s 
that their near neighbour might provide the launching pad for a Japanese attack. 
 
Conclusion 
Pierre Nora (1989) identifies a tendency in the contemporary world for cultural 
memories to challenge, dictate to and even replace history. Certainly the debate over the 
Battle for Australia has been characterised in part by the confrontation between those 
claiming fidelity to memory and the defenders of historical method: on the one hand, 
the evocation of lived experience; on the other, the more dispassionate analyses of 
Japanese strategic planning. Should a truce be declared in the ‘war’ between history and 
memory? Jay Winter proposes that they be viewed as ‘describing a field of force in 
social thought and social action’ (2006: 288). Therefore, through the ‘creative 
engagement’ of those outside and within the academy we might arrive at a public 
history in the field of remembrance that recognises the complexity of the interaction of 
subjective experience, official record and historical research.  
 
Perhaps the closest expression that exists of a ‘public history’ of 1942 is the article that 
appears on the Australian War Memorial website. Under the heading ‘Australia Under 
Attack, 1942–1943’ and the subheading ‘The Battle for Australia,’ it covers the two-
year period by treading a subtle line between recognition of the widespread belief in the 
imminence of invasion and the historical assessments of its improbability: 
 
The attacks on Australia in early 1942 had created the belief that invasion was imminent. Allied 
victories in the second half of 1942, in the Coral Sea, around Midway Island, at Milne Bay, at 
Guadalcanal and on the Kokoda Trail, halted the advance of Japanese forces in the South-West 
Pacific Area. Although the Japanese high command realised that an invasion of the Australian 
mainland was impossible as early as March 1942, continuing air attacks on northern Australia and 
enemy naval activity off the east and west coasts encouraged Australians to believe that the threat 
persisted. 
The Australian civilian population, encouraged to maintain a high state of alert and starved 
of detailed information on the state of the war, fell victim to rumours. Many believed, wrongly as it 
turned out, that a plan—the Brisbane Line—existed to abandon the north and west of the continent 
to the enemy in the event of invasion and only commit to the defence of the most populated areas 
of south-eastern Australia. There was no such plan. 
By mid-1943 Allied victories in the South-West Pacific Area reassured many Australians 
that the threat of invasion had passed. (Australia Under Attack 2010) 
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As the quote demonstrates, the article leaves ambiguous the legitimacy of the public 
belief in an imminent Japanese invasion and the responsibility for it: was it simply the 
attacks by the Japanese that created it? What was the role of Curtin and the government 
in ‘encouraging’ this belief? In ‘forgetting’ the areas of disagreement in order to arrive 
at an anodyne document on which all could agree, there lies perhaps the risk of draining 
the life from national debate in a way that Winter probably would not endorse. 
 
What else must be forgotten in the creation of a new national day? Such forgetting 
includes not only the divergent interpretations of the threat posed by the Japanese, but 
also the role of the Allies, relegated in the section ‘Australia Under Attack, 1942–1943’ 
to a sentence—‘By mid-1943 Allied victories in the South-West Pacific Area reassured 
many Australians that the threat of invasion had passed’ (Australia Under Attack 
2010)—in the Australian War Memorial’s account. The statement occludes the presence 
in Australia of hundreds of thousands of US troops from April 1942, and the fact that 
supreme military command was given to the US General MacArthur, who was not 
always mindful of Australian national sensibilities and who declared that the USA’s war 
aim in the defence of Australia was not intended as the defence of Australia for its own 
sake but part of the USA’s strategic reconquest of the Pacific.10 This ‘surrender of 
sovereignty,’ in Gavin Long’s words (quoted in Long 1973: 181), has been all but 
obliterated from the commemoration of the Battle for Australia—Kevin Rudd’s speech 
on 8 September 2008 contained just one reference to the US allies. 
 
That the politicised debate over the validity of the ‘Battle for Australia’ continues can 
be demonstrated in the article by the military historian Peter Ryan, published in 
September 2009 in Quadrant. Ryan dismisses as ‘nonsense’ the existence of a ‘Battle 
for Australia,’ and voices the fear that the recent focus on the Pacific campaigns will 
detract from recognition of the role of Australian forces elsewhere. Going beyond 
Stanley and even Downer, Ryan asserts, while acknowledging that the National Council 
is made up of veterans and not politicians, that the decision to commemorate the day is 
principally the result of partisan left-wing politics. A passing slight is also cast on the 
advisory role accorded by the Battle for Australia National Council to the Australian 
History Teachers’ Association, an organisation that will no doubt, suggests Ryan, fall in 
with this leftist conspiracy to rewrite history.  
                                                
10 Elsewhere on the Australian War Memorial’s website, however, there are many references to the role of 
the USA in the Pacific conflicts. 
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More broadly, Ryan’s article reveals its rootedness in the ‘old nationalism’ when 
Australian identity was principally derived from belonging to the ‘British race’ and 
occupying a place within the British Empire. This explains his endorsement of the 
legacy of Gallipoli, his reference to Australia’s delusions of independence and self-
importance enshrined in the myth of the battle for Australia, and his opinion that Curtin 
was ‘desperately distraught’ when he ‘loosely’ referred to a ‘Battle for Australia,’ the 
implication being, of course, that Curtin’s demand to Churchill that Australian troops 
return to defend their country was an unjustified, indeed hysterical, over-reaction. These 
familiar themes have characterised both the political and the historical debate over the 
‘Battle for Australia’ for the last ten years, a debate that is clearly far from over.  
 
The virulence with which the debate has been pursued, the ad hominem attacks, suggest 
just how much is at stake in the interpretation of the war legacy as it passes into cultural 
memory and becomes increasingly reliant for transmission on public institutions such as 
schools, the academy, museums and state-organised commemorative activities. 
Moreover, the virulence and attacks confirm the extent to which the officially 
sanctioned narrative of Australian national identity is still associated with military feats. 
Strangely, the collection of essays published in April 2010 under the title What’s Wrong 
with Anzac: The Militarisation of Australian History, does not include a single reference 
to the inauguration of the ‘Battle for Australia’ day, which nevertheless provides 
support for their thesis that ‘the commemoration of war and understanding of our 
national history have been confused and conflated’ (Lake & Reynolds 2010: vii). It 
remains to be seen, however, whether public enthusiasm for Battle for Australia Day 
will carry the same emotional charge as Gallipoli and whether a change in 
‘chronopolitics’—the future return to power of a Federal Coalition government for 
example—will see the day relegated to the sidelines of official commemoration. 
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